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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

K. E. SOVEREEN,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.
Case No. 15782
TERRI MEADOWS,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for unlawful detainer arising
out of the landlord/tenant relationship between the parties.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff obtained a default judgment.

From

said judgment, and from unsuccessful attempts to obtain
relief from said judgment, Defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and
remand to the District Court for trial.
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Defendant paying $150.00 in attorney's fees to Plaintiff
within 30 days of the date of the order (Record, pg. 30).

A

Notice of Intention to Appeal was timely filed (Record, pg.
21) .

Subsequently, Defendant filed a Motion to Stay
Order Granting Attorney's Fees or in the Alternative Payment
of Attorney's Fees into Court.

Plaintiff's counsel responded

by sending an ex parte letter to the judge assigned to hear
the motion opposing the relief sought (Record pg. 22).

In

support of said Motion was an Affidavit of Impecuniosity
executed by Defendant (Record pg. 29).
Motion on March 20, 1978.
appeared.

The court, heard the

Neither Plaintiff nor his attorney

The Court ordered Defendant to pay the previously-

ordered $150.00 into court instead of to Plaintiff (Record,
pg. 33).
On March 13, 1978, Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim was filed (Record pg. 23-26).

The Counterclaim alleged

that on January 6, 1978, Plaintiff confiscated all personal
property of Defendant located in the apartment.

The legal

theories alleged were conversion, noncompliance with the
exemption statute, wrongful attachment, and deceptive or
unconscionable act or practice.

Pursuant to the Counterclaim,

a Motion for Writ of Replevin was filed (Record, pg. 31-32).
It was supported by an Affidavit of Defendant in compliance
with Rule 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff (landlord) and Defendant (tenant) entered
into an oral rental agreement for an apartment located in
Salt Lake City, Utah at $135.00 per month rent.

According

to Plaintiff's Complaint, an eviction notice was served upon
Defendant on November 3, 1977 (Record, pg. 4).

Plaintiff

filed a Complaint on December 12, 1977, alleging that Defendant was in unlawful detainer on the basis of nonpayment
of rent, and obtained a Judgment by Default on January 5,
1978.

Said judgment
~----------

N~---=9_2_7

included_:tx.ghl~_dfilna~es__g.ccru~~g from
----

until

----------

~~e _J>re_mises

were vacated, plus costs

and attorneys fees (Record, pg. 17-18).

Defendant vacated

the premises on January 6, 1978, after she was served with a
writ of restitution on that date.
A Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed
on January 16, 1978, listing several reasons in support of
the motion (Record, pg. 9-10).

Said motion was accompanied

by an Affidavit of Defendant, alleging that she first received a copy of the Complaint after the default judgment
was obtained, and that she disputed the amount and nature of
relief granted in said judgment (Record pg. 15-16).
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was heard
on March 3, 1978.

The court granted the Motion subject to
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Affidavit also described the items of personal

prope~ty

taken, and expressed the belief that said property was
exempt within the meaning of the provisions of Utah Code
§78-21-1.
The Motion for Writ of Replevin was heard on
March 30, 1978.

Said Motion was opposed by Plaintiff on the

theory that Defendant could not proceed until she had paid
$150.00 into court.

Defendant attended the hearing, and

offered to testify as to her financial inability to pay any
amount.

The court denied the Motion.
On April 13, 1978, the Court, based upon the non-

payment of $150.00 by Defendant within 30 days of its previous
order, entered an Order denying Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PORTIONS OF THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT
ARE CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE UTAH LAW,
AND THUS ARE VOID.
The default judgment obtained by Plaintiff (Record,
pg. 17-18) awarded damages of $479.00, plus treble damages
in the amount of $13.50 per day from November 6, 1977 to the
date on which the premises were vacated, costs in the amount
of $27.90, attorney's fees in the amount of $100.00, all

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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amounts to draw interest at 8%, and a writ of restitution.
The total amount of the judgment is $1,443.90, plus 8%
interest accruing from January 6, 1978.

Substantially all

of said default judgment is contrary to Utah statutory and
case law, and thus should be declared void or modified
accordingly.
A.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER, AND THUS IT WAS ERROR TO
AWARD TREBLE DAMAGES AND A WRIT
OF RESTITUTION.

Utah's unlawful detainer statute, Utah Code §78-36-1
et seq., governs actions by a landlord to evict a tenant.
This Court has reviewed this statute on a number of occasions,
and has repeatedly ruled that, due to the summary procedure
and severe remedy involved, the statute must be strictly
complied with before the cause of action provided may be ma
maintained to enforce the obligations imposed by it; see
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U.468, 243 P.2d 446

(1952), and Van

Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 U.2d 367, 393 P.2d 468

(1964).

In

addition, this Court has established tort liability for
noncompliance with the statute; see King v. Firm, 3 U2d
419, 285 P.2d 1114

(1955).

-5-
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Prior to the filing of an unlawful detainer action,
an appropriate eviction notice must be served upon the
tenant.

In the present case, the unlawful detainer action

was based upon nonpayment of rent.

The provisions of Utah

Code §78-36-3(3) govern what constitutes unlawful detainer
and what the eviction notice must provide in the case of
nonpayment of rent:
A tenant

is guilty of an unlawful detainer:

(3) When he continues in possession ... after
default in the payment of rent and after a
notice in writing requiring in the alternative
the payment of the rent or the surrender of
the detained premises, shall have remained
uncomplied with for a period of three days
after service thereof ...
In other words, the eviction notice must state that the
tenant has the alternative of paying the rent owed or vaeating the premises within three days after service of the
eviction notice.
The eviction notice in this case (Record, pg. 4)
did not provide the alternative to the tenant to pay the
rent owed within three days, and therefore did not comply
with the statute.
~.

In the case of American Holding Co. v.

23 U.2d 432, 464 P.2d 592

(1970), this Court con-

sidered a factual situation where the unlawful detainer
action was based on nonpayment of rent, and the eviction
notice did not provide the alternative of paying the rent

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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owed.

This Court held that the statutory requirements were

not complied, and that the landlord was not entitled to
maintain an action for unlawful detainer.
Swan, 3 U.2d 59, 278 P.2d 294

In Jacobson v.

(1954), the eviction notice

served was simply an unconditional notice to quit premises
with no alternative provided to pay the rent owed.

This

Court ruled that the landlord's damages should not have been
trebled, but should have been limited to the amount of rent
prescribed in the rental agreement.

In the present case,

under American Holding Co. and Jacobson, Plaintiff was not
entitled to treble damages or restitution of the premises,
since the eviction notice did not comply with the statute.
In Perkins v. Spencer, supra, the landlord did

n~

comply with the statute providing the manner in which the
eviction notice must be served.

This Court ruled that under

such circumstances the landlord was entitled to nominal
damages only, and thus could not maintain an action for
unlawful detainer when the statutes were not followed.
Thus, in the present case, Plaintiff was entitled to only
nominal damages, and was not entitled to either treble
damages or restitution of the premises.
In the present case Plaintiff improperly executed
upon the writ of restitution, by having it served one day
after the obtaining of the default judgment.

The provisions

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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of Utah Code §78-36-10, as interpreted in the case of Monter
v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 U.2d 18, 504 P.2d 40
(1972), provides that in an unlawful detainer action for
nonpayment of rent, execution upon a judgment shall not
issue until five days expire after the entry of the judgment,
in which period the tenant may satisfy the judgment and be
restored to the premises.

Again, it is clear that Plaintiff

did not comply with applicable law.
For all the above reasons, Defendant was never in
unlawful detainer.

Based upon the noncompliance with the

statutes, those portions of the default judgment awarding in
excess of nominal damages are void.
B.

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES.

Statutory authority does not appear in Utah's
unlawful detainer statute authorizing the recovery of attorneys
fees in an eviction action.

This is due in part to the

treble damage provision in Utah Code §78-36-10, which operates
as a statutory penalty in the landlord's favor where a
tenant is found to be in unlawful detainer.

Therefore, the

recovery of attorney's fees must be based on another legal
theory.

However, such a theory is not discernable from the

record.

Plaintiff never alleged any agreement or other

statutory authority providing for the recovery of attorney's
fees.

In the absence of such an agreement or statutory

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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authority, the common law rule that attorneys fees are not
recoverable applies.

Therefore, that portion of Plaintiff's

default judgment providing for attorney's fees is void.
Point II of this Brief will address the improprie0
of conditioning the setting aside of a default judgment upon
the payment of attorneys fees.

It is indeed ironic that, in

a case where attorney's fee could not have been recovered
had the matter been contested, the setting aside of a default
judgment could be conditioned upon payment of attorney's
fees.

For this additional reason, the awards of attorneys

fees, both in the default judgment and in the conditional
order setting aside the judgment, should be considered void.
C.

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVER COSTS.

It is not the position of Defendant that costs are
not recoverable in an unlawful detainer action, but instead
that costs are not recoverable under the facts and circumstances of this case.

In order for a party to recover

costs, an affidavit must be submitted, pursuant to Rule
54(d) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:

How Assessed.
The party who claims his
costs must within five days after the
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse
party against whom costs are claimed, a
copy of a memorandum of the items of his
costs and necessary disbursements in the
action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiants' knowledge the items are
correct, and that the disbursements have
been necessarily incurred in the action or
ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Lawproceeding.
Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In using the word "must", the language of the Rule is clear
that such a memorandum of costs is mandatory and must be
submitted in accordance with the time provision in order for a
party to recover costs.
In the present case, it is apparent from the record
that no such memorandum of costs was ever submitted.

Therefore,

Plaintiff is not entitled to recover costs, and that portion of
the default judgment awarding costs is void.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN CONDITIONING THE GRANT OF AN
ORDER SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT
UPON THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
The statutory authority for setting aside default
judgments is found in Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

In addition, this Court has rendered

numerous decisions interpreting the statutory provisions.
These cases support Defendant's position that the condition
of paying attorney's fees, under the facts and circumstances
of this case, was an abuse of discretion and therefore
constituted reversible error.
Several principles have been repeatedly cited by
this Court as to setting aside of default judgments.

First,

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for-10digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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it is the declared policy of the court that in cases of
uncertainty, default judgments shall be set aside to allow
trial on the merits; Locke v. Peterson, 3 U2d 415, 285 P.2d
1111 (1955).

Second, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse

to vacate a default if there is a timely application and
there are reasonable grounds to do so, and doubts should be
resolved in favor of setting aside default judgments;
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 4 U2d 415, 303 P.2d 995 (1956).
Third, trial courts should be generally indulgent in permitting full inquiry, and it is an abuse of discretion to
refuse to vacate a default judgment where there are reasonahl
grounds and excuse for Defendant's failure to appear, and a
timely application is made to set it aside; Mayhew v. Standar
Gilsonite, 14 U2d 52, 376 P.2d 951

(1962).

Fourth, default

judgments are not favored by the courts nor are they in the
interest of fair play; Heathman v. Fabian and Clendenin,
14 U2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962).

Fifth, courts should be

somewhat indulgent in setting aside defaults; McKean v.
Mountain View Memorial Estates, 17 U2d 323, 4 U P.2d 129
(1966).

Sixth, courts should be liberal in allowing parties

to get to the merits of the case; Barber v. Calder,
522 P.2d 700 (Ut. 1974).

-11-
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The decision of this Court closest in point is
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142 (Ut.
1977).

In that case the motion to set aside the default

iudgment was based upon an uncontroverted affidavit of the
~fendant
~e

stating he had not been served with the Complaint.

Court reversed the denial of the motion, the concurring

~inion

of Justice Crockett focused on the fact that the

affidavit in support of the motion was unrefuted.

The

language of the opinion is significant:
In the absence of a challenging pleading
of equal dignity with his affidavit, there
is no basis upon which the court could find
contrary to his averment.
In accordance
with what has been said above, and with the
declared policy of the law to be liberal in
setting aside a default judgment to the end
that a party may have his day in court, I
would remand for that purpose.
Id, at 1144.
The

holding of this case only remanded the matter for an

evidentiary hearing on whether the Defendant was personally
~rved.

In the present case the uncontroverted affidavit of

defendant (Record, pg. 15-16) alleges that she was never
served with the Complaint.

Plaintiff's affidavit also

disputes the amount and nature of the default judgment, and
much of this Brief addresses other improprieties in Plaintiff's
~tions

and in the default judgment.

Therefore it is appropriate

for this Court to reverse and set aside the default judgment
in its entirety.

-12ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
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There are many other cases on point, most of them
citing identical or similar principles to the ones already
mentioned; see, for example, Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 704

(Ut.

1977); Bowen Trucking, Inc., v. Public Service Comm.,
559 P.2d 954 (1977); Dynapac, Inc., v. Innovations, Inc.,
550 P.2d 191 (Ut. 1976); Westinghouse Electric Supply Co.,
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Ut. 1975);
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 U2d 65, 475
P.2d 1005 (1970), Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d 602

(Ut. 1952);

and Dixon v. Dixon, 240 P.2d 1211 (Ut. 1952); Woody v.
Rhodes, 23 U2d 249, 461 P.2d 465

(1969); Utah Sand & Gravel

Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 U2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
Ney v. Harrison, 5 U2d 217, P.2d 1114 (1956); Kelly v. Scott,
5 U2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956).
Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment was filed eleven (11) days after its entry.

The motion

was supported by an affidavit of defendant (Record, pg. 1516) and was uncontroverted by counteraffidavit.

As shown in

Point I, substantial portions of the default judgment are
void.

In particular, Point I.B. demonstrates why attorneys

fees were not recoverable, and therefore should not have
been granted.

Yet the order granting the motion to set

aside default judgment was conditioned upon the payment of
additional attorneys fees.
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A second affidavit, also uncontroverted by counteraffidavit, was submitted to the court (Record, pg. 29),
stating that defendant was impecunious, and, owing to her
poverty, was unable to bear the expenses of the legal proceedings commenced, and that she believed she was justly
entitled to the relief sought.

A third affidavit of defendant,

again uncontroverted by counteraffidavit, alleged wrongdoing
by plaintiff in the execution of the default judgment (Record,
pg. 37-38) .
In three hearings conducted in the lower court,
all before the same judge, the arguments contained in this
Brief were presented, and the affidavits of defendant submitted.

In conditioning the grant of an order setting aside

the default judgment upon the payment of attorney's fees,
the lower court abused its discretion and thus committed
reversible error.
The practical consequences of conditioning relief
on the payment of money by an impoverished individual should
be considered.

Obviously, an impecunious person who cannot

afford even the basic court costs of maintaining or defending
a lawsuit cannot pay the sum of $150.00.

Thus the order of

the court, as applied to a poor person, is the functional
equivalent of unconditionally denying her motion.

As applied

to the facts and circumstances of this case, the effect of
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the court's ruling is that defendant is not entitled to
relief merely because of her poverty.

This result, with its

precedential effect, must not be permitted by this Court on
appeal.
Viewing the facts and circumstances of his case in
light of the statutory and case law, the lower court should
have set aside the default judgment.

First, it is question-

able whether defendant was properly served with the Complaint,
and thus, whether the lower court had jurisdiction to enter
its judgment.

The uncontroverted affidavit of defendant

(Record pg. 15-16) alleges that she was never served with
the Complaint.

Plaintiff's affidavit also disputes the

amount and nature of the default judgment, and this Brief
addresses other improprieties in Plaintiff's actions and in
the default judgment.

This Court in Stan Katz Real Estate,

Inc. remanded the matter on much the same basis.
Second, the motion to set aside the default judgment
was timely filed pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The basis for the motion, as stated in several

uncontroverted supporting affidavits, demonstrates reasonable grounds and excuse for the failure of defendant to
appear and defend the lawsuit.
Defendant's affidavits reveal substantial

uncertain~

regarding the appropriateness of the provisions of the default
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judgment.

Those provisions and the subsequent actions by

Plaintiff, show that it would not be just or equitable to
allow the judgment to stand.

In the interest of fair play,

defendant should be afforded the opportunity to defend her
case on the merits.
Finally, the lower court's decision is contrary to
the liberal and indulgent position taken by this Court in
setting aside default judgments by conditioning its ruling
upon a requirement that a litigant cannot meet.

There is no

reason, based upon the previously enunciated principles, for
the court to deny defendant's motion.

There only remains

the condition of paying attorney's fees -- a condition
unsupported by law or equity.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant requests this
Court to reverse the decision of the lower court, to Order
the default judgment be set aside, and to remand the matter
to District Court for a hearing on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

TRICIA DeMICHELE
~ttorneys for Appellant
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